POBNEWS24, Dhaka, Dec 14, 2021 : As the representative of the Prime Minister of the expatriate Bangladesh government in 1971, Maidul Hasan worked closely with the high level policy makers of the Government of India. He later wrote two books , Main Section ’71 and Subsection 71, March-April . He is writing another book in the light of his own experience by looking at the documents of the liberation war which were released in different countries. The third installment of the thirteenth chapter of the book to be published by him was published today.
In June, a committee of inquiry set up by the Indian government on the ground tried to find out the opinion of the commanders of the Muktifauj. Or if the freedom fighters have to fight alone to defeat the Pakistanis, how far do they need to increase their strength? These investigations are being carried out to find out the views of those who will probably participate in the campaign on the ground. Probably also to indicate that the Indian war planners are doing their staff-work to determine how many and to what extent they will need the freedom fighters and freedom fighters to make the Indian intervention a success.
The capability of the Liberation Army
Recorded by the Indian Investigation Team: “A Sector Commander of the Liberation Army was asked during the discussion whether he would support a direct single intervention of the Indian Army against Pakistan. He replied that without the help of the Liberation Army, the intervention of the Indian Army alone could not be successful. He was of the opinion that the Liberation Army might have been able to accomplish this task alone, but unfortunately, no attempt was made to test their capabilities. He is confident that the Liberation Army can defeat the Pakistani forces on its own if it has a division consisting of regular troops, 50,000 irregular guerrilla freedom fighters and the necessary weapons and armaments including heavy artillery (25 pounds), anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank grenades.
In order to make the liberation war a success, one or two other groups concerned at that time were looking into the matter from different points of view, so that they could be considered before making a decision at a higher policy-making level. If Mizan Rahman Chowdhury had worked hard to gather information about the freedom fighters on the ground, as well as the attitudes of the freedom fighters and their commanders to give some advice to improve the situation, then perhaps they would have been helpful in determining the preparation and method of war. Instead, he told the acting president only about the plight of the freedom fighters, and the fact that they were being circulated among the conference participants at the moment created a strong opinion against India’s dependence on India.
Support for Tajuddin’s leadership
No direct allegations were made against Tajuddin Ahmed. But among the participating members: Tajuddin was mainly blamed for his dependence on India for talks and whispers. In these propaganda activities, Foreign Minister Khandaker Mushtaq Ahmed became the most active in creating doubts about the purpose of India and Tajuddin’s ability to conduct the war of liberation by resisting it.
Mizan Chowdhury declared from the conference stage that there is no hope for them to win in the way this liberation war is going on. Rather, it is better to go back to the country and fight there, and if there is no success, then it is realistic to compromise with Pakistan. On the contrary, Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam announced that the training of freedom fighters has already been expanded in line with the promises made by the Government of India in favor of the Liberation War, the results of which need at least three months to be transmitted. So don’t be impatient before that. Other cabinet members remained silent on the matter. Therefore, the responsibility of supporting the policy followed fell on Tajuddin.
Tajuddin Ahmed first of all acknowledged the incomplete efforts of the liberation war and the endless misery of the freedom fighters and the need to speed up the liberation war as soon as possible by correcting all these imperfections and mistakes. “Despite the worldwide condemnation and sympathy for the victims of Pakistan’s long-running genocide, no country other than India has come forward to help us in the war of liberation that we have been forced to wage in retaliation for their colonial war,” he said. Therefore, in pursuit of the real situation, we are pursuing the policy of accepting their help as much as possible, so that we can build our own strength and organization of our liberation struggle as soon as possible, even relying on this limited help.
Tajuddin declared that the relentless struggle and endless sacrifices required for the final victory would not be possible for all delegates and that the emergence of competent leadership would take place here. But victory will be inevitable for Bangladesh. Tajuddin was greeted with loud applause and it was assumed that Tajuddin’s leadership in the country’s liberation struggle had the support of a large majority of the people’s representatives.
The next day, at a meeting of the Awami League’s executive committee, it was decided that the former All Pakistan Awami League, led by Mizan Chowdhury, would not be the only party whose legitimate organization would be the Tajuddin-led East Pakistan Awami League.
Four days later, on 10 July, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Tajuddin Ahmed, simultaneously attended a conference of sector commanders of the Bangladesh Army at a secret location in Kolkata. There, too, the sector is facing a deep crisis due to another kind of anger and resentment among the sector commanders.
Tajuddin’s radio speech
Earlier, in the first week of April, after several unsuccessful spontaneous clashes with the Pakistan Army, Major KM Safiullah and Major Khaled Musharraf met with some of their subordinates at Teliapara Tea Garden in Sylhet to work out the next course of action. There, with the help of BSF, Colonel (Retd.) MAG Osmani and Major Ziaur Rahman joined. The government of Bangladesh has not been decided yet. They were not aware that Tajuddin had just met the Indian Prime Minister in Delhi and started discussions on the subject. Nevertheless, it was at this Teliapara tea garden meeting that the rebel majors decided that the armed rebels, led by their all-acceptable commander, Connell Osmani, would continue the war of independence until the country became independent.
In early April, Tajuddin could not establish any direct contact with them. But on the basis of their resolve obtained through BSF, in his first radio address on 10 April, he assigned Ziaur Rahman in Chittagong, Major Safiullah in Sylhet, Major Khaled Mosharraf in Comilla and Major Abu Osman Chowdhury in Kushtia.
However, after the swearing in of the cabinet members of the expatriate Bangladesh government on 16 April, there were problems with the recovery of Chinese weapons, production of their alternatives in India, restrictions on acquisition of arms including Indian brands, inability to procure foreign arms financially. Despite this, their sector commanders maintained the view that in response to Pakistan’s hostile policy, the Indian authorities could not at one time allocate arms for the war of liberation.
Meanwhile, as the influx of refugees increased, the Indian Army was tasked with establishing field contact with Bangladesh’s sector commanders from May. Earlier this work was done by BSF. In view of the relentless onslaught of Pakistan, the Indian Army supports the idea of the Bangladesh Army and concludes that the only military way to defeat them is to establish an independent Bangladesh and resolve the refugee crisis. As a result, delegates from both sides exchanged views on possible war strategies and mutual cooperation on the ground.
It was at this point that some of the Bangladeshi military officials began to think that if their central leadership had discussed the possibility of mutual cooperation at a higher level with the Indian authorities, the war plan could have improved. But the central leadership of the army at the time consisted of only three or four officers and the chief of staff, General (Retd.) Osmani, who was elderly and retired, uninterested in the question of delegating responsibility to someone else. He did not usually contact the concerned officials of the Indian side on his own initiative. Probably a factor as to why they’re doing so poorly. So the sector commanders had some idea of the difficulties that might befall him as a senior in the rank-and-file.
Another weakness of Colonel Osmani was the frequent allegations from various quarters that the only way to deal with the Pakistani forces was to use guerrilla tactics considering their numbers and capabilities. But following that method, no leadership could be obtained from Osmani. Among most sector commanders, the notion began to emerge that throughout his career, Osmani had only been acquainted with conventional warfare. So it could not be as familiar with irregular, decentralized and local innovative tactics as guerrilla warfare. But there was no single person like him among them who could have been the chief of Bangladesh army.
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